Abstract-As the field of determined and increasingly sophisticated adversaries multiplies, the risk to integrity of deployed computing devices magnifies. Given the ubiquitous connectivity, substantial storage, and accessibility, the increased reliance on computer platforms make them a significant target for attackers. Over the past decade, malware has transitioned from attacking a single program to subverting the operating system (OS) kernel by means of what is commonly known as a rootkit. While computer systems require patches to fix newly discovered vulnerabilities, undiscovered vulnerabilities remain. Furthermore, typical solutions utilize mechanisms that operate within the OS. If the OS becomes compromised, these mechanisms may be vulnerable to being disabled or upon detection of the potential compromise, being "shut down" until patched, or otherwise mitigated.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a computer system that detects an anomaly but needs to maintain certain critical service levels or functions in spite of the untrusted nature of the compromised system. Further, imagine this system dynamically migrating to a lower level of integrity and associated functionality while taking steps to re-establish higher integrity and re-enable richer functionality. This work proposes a computing system paradigm that assumes compromise rather than trying to prevent all possible compromise from happening.
A common model of modern computing systems relies on privilege levels also known as protection rings. More specifically, the computer system uses two rings of the central processing unit (CPU) to enforce this separation: the application or user level (i.e., ring 3) and the kernel or supervisor level (i.e., ring 0). The kernel runs at a higher privilege level than any of the applications on the computer system. This model allows for application development without any knowledge of the underlying system. Hence, the application level has the responsibility for running the code that implements the functionality of the application, and the kernel focuses on the underlying hardware and performs tasks with the hardware on behalf of the application. In particular, the kernel provides support for access to hardware and privileged functions by means of a library. The applications can call library functions to use the hardware. Furthermore, the kernel maintains separation between the applications, logs important events that occur, and attempts to prevent compromise of the computer system. This model has served as the fundamental computing paradigm for the last few decades.
All functionality of the kernel tends to run at the same privilege level (i.e., a monolithic kernel). This means code for event logging, the hardware abstraction interface, networking, and other kernel functionality can access data and code responsible for maintaining the security of the system. Therefore, malware has many (or potentially many) points to compromise. Once compromised, the entire kernel codebase is at risk.
Instead of attacking hardened points of entry, attackers find the weakest link to attack. A vulnerable function as simple as logging events or reading a symbolic link can allow the attacker to modify more serious kernel objects such as the system call table, interrupt vector table, or other critical data structures (both control and non-control) inside the kernel [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Protection mechanisms in the kernel utilize the same address space as rootkits. Hence, it becomes a potential race condition to determine if the malware can successfully disable the protection mechanism.
In this work, we pursue a polymorphic computing system paradigm that mitigates compromise based on a declarative policy specification separate from implementation. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents use cases; Section III presents an overview of integrity levels; Section IV presents details; Section V presents our prototype; Section VI presents challenges and limitations of integrity levels; Section VII presents future work; Section VIII discusses related work; and we finish with the conclusion in Section IX.
II. USE CASES
Before discussing the prototype or details, we start with potential use cases of integrity levels. This paradigm is not limited to these examples, but they provide a good illustration of the diversity that integrity levels can support. We start with the challenges of protecting cloud computing, consumer phones, and smart meters.
A. Current Challenge
We believe the current challenge with computer systems stems from critical security functions running at the same privilege level as the non-critical security functions. Also, the flexibility of modern operating system (OS) design allows for expansion (e.g., kernel modules) with an interface to extend base functionality. Recent designs require signature checking of kernel modules/drivers before being added to the kernel [6] . Even with these new protections, current systems may still have weaknesses. Additionally, when a system is compromised, no concept of a degraded state exists [7] . Either the system has a clean working state or the malware has control of the complete system (depending on the level of compromise). The period between compromise and detection leaves time for the malware to exfiltrate sensitive data or to subvert operation. The goal of this work is to detect compromise while allowing a degraded state after compromise has occurred (rather than a complete denial of service to the user).
Before elaborating on the elements of integrity levels, we provide a succinct description of the intended functionality of a degraded state. Typical computer systems have a general environment and provide access to most (if not all) peripherals. When the system enters a degraded state, the network card may tag packets to let the network know this computer has moved into a "degraded state." This integrity labeling corresponds to "integrity labels" as in the Biba model [8] . As another example, a process may no longer see the entire storage medium (e.g., hard drive, USB stick, etc.). Instead, it sees a subset of the storage medium-similar to chroot on Linux systems or Bromium [9, 10] . The uniqueness of the integrity levels concept is not the degraded state, but the ability to move into and out of this degraded state based on the integrity of the computing system (i.e., the level of detected/suspected compromise).
B. Cloud Computing
Cloud computing environments typically have a number of virtual machines (VMs) running on top of a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM). If one of the VMs becomes compromised, it can detrimentally affect the other VMs on the same hardware [11, 12] . Furthermore, the VM could be used in distributed denial of service attacks and other network probing attacks within the data center. Typically, the cloud provider offers no mitigation for this type of event. It is up to the user to reset the VM from the control panel provided by the cloud provider.
By adding integrity levels to the system, each VM can be at a different integrity level. If a VM's integrity becomes too low, it can be moved to a network that is more closely monitored (e.g., a honeypot or deception network). The VM still runs, and the service is still available. However, the location of the VM may change due to the change in integrity level. Additional mitigations could be employed to harden the network and other VMs against a compromised VM. Hence, this feature can be used a market differentiator as well.
C. Smartphones
Smartphones have become an essential part in both consumer and business lifestyles. Smartphones host sensitive data for both consumers and businesses. Therefore, compromise on a smartphone may actually be worse than losing a laptop or desktop. Once a compromise enters a smartphone, it is typically up to the information technology (IT) department to determine if a device is no longer trusted. Considering the number of devices on a modern enterprise network, this presents a challenge.
A smartphone built with integrity levels has a variety of mitigations normally not available. For example, consider a piece of malware that attempts to modify a system level structure (e.g., system call table, vector table, process list, etc.) outside of normal operating conditions. The policy could lower the integrity of the device and prevent further writes. It could also restore the structure from a known pristine copy. Furthermore, network connectivity could be disabled or filtered while utilizing a light-emitting diode (LED) on the device to alert the user. Other mitigations, such as tagging network data, could alert the enterprise to take a closer look at the device.
Instead of always migrating downward, a user may upgrade the integrity level of a device voluntarily as long as it does not violate the current policy. For example, a user may want to process sensitive information on the device. In this case, the device blocks all communication out of the device and only allows communication to a particular internet protocol (IP) address or network. In addition, a new partition or data area becomes available. Additional filtering could be applied to the network packets prior to transmission. Once processing is complete, the user could initiate a downgrade. The data would be hidden again and the network connection would return to normal. In this case, the functionality of the device changed based on the integrity level, which protects data from leaving the device.
D. Smart Meters
Smart meters enable two-way communication between the meter and the central office. They provide opportunities to inform the user of current energy usage and potential cost savings based on current energy demand and energy price. These devices communicate back to the central office over a wireless or wired interface. An adversary may attempt to send incorrect network packets in order to get the meter to misbehave (e.g., send wrong/lower energy usage). If successful, the meter reports incorrect readings-typically, in favor of the customer.
Designing smart meters with integrity levels provides for mitigation against this attack and potentially others. First, when the misconfigured packet is received, the smart meter system logs such information. After a set amount of incorrect packets, the meter turns into a "dumb" meter. The primary function of recording energy usage is still present, but the attack surface (due to a functionality change) has been reduced on-the-fly. A technician may need to visit the smart meter in order to restore smart functionality.
III. INTEGRITY LEVEL OVERVIEW
As a thought exercise, we ask the reader to think how computers would be designed differently if we started with all current technology and lessons learned in place. We began with this premise and looked at how the existing paradigm for computing system design could change. Current computer systems have various protection mechanisms (e.g., data execution prevention (DEP), address space layout randomization (ASLR), canaries, sandboxing, etc.) in place to detect or prevent compromise from malware. However, systems are still compromised despite these protections. Therefore, we propose a repeatable, novel paradigm for designing polymorphic computing systems that have the ability to react dynamically to compromise. While we don't believe our system blocks all possible attacks, we do believe our design focuses on event points and not attack vectors.
We envision a system that detects an anomaly and dynamically migrates to a lower level of functionality or data access while taking steps to re-establish higher integrity levels. We seek to operate with compromise in addition to having the ability to prevent or detect it. Our design methodology consists of three parts: the model, the architecture, and the policy. The model moves from the standard OS/application model to a four-domain model. The architecture varies depending on application space. The policy specifies graceful degradation of a system rather than an automatic denial of service when a policy violation occurs. In effect, the same anomaly can cause the system to respond differently depending on the current integrity level of the computing system.
A. Integrity Level Elements
We envision three components involved in the design of integrity levels: the model, the implementation, and the policy as shown in Fig. 1 . The model specifies the what, the architecture specifies the how, and the policy specifies the when. Combining these three factors constitutes what we believe is a new paradigm for computing environments. We assert that these components provide the required structure to enable a computer system to react to the next generation of malware with great agility. 
B. Integrity Level Definition
Integrity levels (ILs) are a range of more secure and less secure states within a system. An individual IL is a collection of system states that the policy treats as a single level for determining what functionality to allow and what functionality to disallow. Before we can explain how to implement them, we need to define them and how they apply to modern-day computer systems.
First, we start with an analogy. Many ecommerce sites require the user to log in with a username and password. Many of these sites allow the user to remain "logged in" even after the browser has closed. Effectively, the site considers the integrity of the user dependent upon sending a valid session cookie. When the user wants to make a purchase, view order history, edit a profile, or perform another higher integrity function, the user is prompted to enter the password again or answer a security question. Furthermore, if the user logs in from an unknown computer, a security question may be posed.
This sequence of events embodies the concept of integrity levels. When the user first logs in, the user most likely has a high integrity level. This is due to the fact of a recent (within one minute) successful login authentication. Typically, the user can do anything within the account permissions. If no activity is detected after five minutes, the integrity moves down a level. Then, if the user wants to edit the profile, either the password or security question (or both) is required to move back to a higher level of integrity. Many websites have adopted this model.
We seek to construct a computing system design methodology that enables a similar paradigm in a controlled fashion. Instead of designing a system to prevent all compromise, we explore a strategy for a computing system to operate with detected anomalies that may constitute compromise, but in a degraded state. What constitutes a degraded state depends on the system's policy specification.
IV. INTEGRITY LEVEL DETAILS
The model specifies how a system's behavior (i.e., data and control flow) can change over time due to environment stimuli. The architecture states the rules that must be satisfied by a given computing system to ensure computation will follow the model. For example, if the computing system does not have privilege levels, it may not be possible to build a system with integrity levels. On the other hand, there may be alternatives that still provide the functional equivalent of privilege levels depending on the application space. Effectively, the architecture is the realization of the model. The policy states the behavior that the system should exhibit given compromise or anomalies in the system.
A. Model Details
Our model consists of four domains as shown in Fig. 2 . A domain encapsulates a particular responsibility of the integrity level model. The domains are functional, enforcement, reporting, and policy. Each domain contributes specific features that enable the system to navigate integrity levels appropriately. Each domain has independence with respect to the other domains, and there exists a controlled information
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Level Design Model Architecture Policy flow between domains. While there is nothing unique about having four domains, we do not see where more or less domains improve the model. Our approach to generating domains stems from dividing the computer system into discrete operational partitions. We feel more research should be done in this area to expand the completeness of our model. In the following sections, we describe the domains in more detail. 
1) Functional Domain
The functional domain (FD) provides what typically is considered the "function" of the computing system. In an integrity level-based system, a majority of the code lies in this domain. By code, we mean the OS, libraries, user applications, and device drivers. This domain greatly resembles the existing model we have for modern-day computer systems. While we could move some items to the other domains, we sense that all of the above code deals primarily with the function of the computer system. Furthermore, breaking up all existing code and porting it to a non-compatible new paradigm, while possible, impedes the viability of our idea. We decided on a compromise that allows for legacy designs, but adds a more agile security model.
2) Enforcement Domain
The enforcement domain (ED) enforces the policy (or allowable states) of the computer system. It contains a runtime engine that maps the policy into implementable functionality using features of the underlying computer architecture. For example, if a write to the system call table violates a policy, the runtime engine ensures the page table permissions are set to detect when this occurs. Different application spaces that use different architectures will have a different runtime engine inside the ED. Typically, most of the code in the ED is architecture-independent, but will contain application space dependent code as well as architecture-specific code. For example, the ED code on a tablet computer would differ from the ED code on a medical device or automobile. Lastly, the ED provides bindings similar to late runtime bindings on just-intime (JIT) platforms. The policy has placeholders (e.g., strings or enumerations) that need translation on a given architecture. For example, the string "system call table" has no location or meaning until the ED runtime engine translates the string into a starting address and range. Similar translations occur for other aspects of the policy grammar.
3) Reporting Domain
The reporting domain (RD) focuses on logging events of interest, which may or may not be violations of the policy. A secondary focus of the RD analyzes the logged events to glean a higher insight into the system. Furthermore, the RD can send the violations off for further (non-real-time) processing. Additionally, machine learning algorithms, behavior analysis, and other environment analyzers can run within the domain to detect advanced attacks (e.g., 0-day and advanced persistence threats). While a single violation tends to represent a single point in time, having a database or log of these events allows for the consideration of space and time effects between events. Hence, the RD does not necessarily need to operate in "realtime" as does the ED. This domain potentially opens the door for much more advanced analysis and response mechanisms not employed or feasible today.
4) Policy Domain
The policy domain (PD) contains the integrity level policy of the computing system. It specifies how the system should respond at each integrity level and what events cause the system to migrate up or down. Effectively, a policy should describe the acceptable operation of a computer system whereby malware should violate this description. Unlike the other domains, the PD is the only domain that contains the current integrity level. If the system allows updating the policy, it happens in the PD. As stated earlier, the policy does not specify how to enforce the specification-this job is left up to the ED. However, the ED does notify the PD when events of interest or violations occur. Furthermore, the ED can alert the PD if the specified policy cannot be enforced (e.g., due to limitations of the architecture).
5) Domain Interaction and Updates
While domain interaction remains an area of open research, there are some constraints for our model. First, the FD and PD never interact. Considering that our model seeks to constrain compromise to the FD, preventing this interaction assists with securing the most sensitive aspect of the computer system: the policy.
Based on our current model, the RD, ED, and PD constitute a three-part "reference validation mechanism" (an implementation of a reference monitor) in the sense of the "Anderson Report" [13] . The "reference validation mechanism" enforces policy and must be 1) always invoked, 2) tamperproof, and 3) small enough to be verified correct and complete. Moreover, these domains should only be updated in a limited mode environment (e.g., secure mode of ARM Trustzone®, Intel™ SMM/TXT/SGX, etc.). We still believe that the ED, RD, and PD would rarely be updated. This is an assumption until widespread use confirms this assertion.
B. Architecture Details
While the model may serve as a way to understand design principles, without a way to implement it, integrity levels don't add much to building more secure systems. Furthermore, each g application space will have different architecture requirements. Therefore, we focus on architecture requirements for traditional computing environments (e.g., tablet, laptop, server, etc.).
While we believe new processor architectures and technologies would benefit the implementation of integrity levels, we focus on how to build them with existing technologies. In particular, we believe virtualization and security extensions of existing processors provide avenues for building integrity level-based systems. Other CPU features may assist with the architecture as well. For example, multicore architectures may only run certain domains on specific cores. Furthermore, the debug architecture on some platforms may be useful. For our work, we require the architecture to enforce these features:
•
The ED must run at a higher privilege than the FD.
• The FD and RD may exist at the same privilege level.
• The PD should exist inside its own privilege level separate from the other domains
• The FD and PD don't communicate.
• The twelve rules as stated in [14] for an integrityprotected hypervisor.
Given the above requirements, various architectures can be used. We present three preliminary architectures and briefly discuss two representative architectures based on current processors. The first architecture puts all three domains into a VM except the ED as shown in Fig. 3 . The ED resides in a higher privilege level as it is a core requirement of the architecture. A slight variation of this design is shown in Fig. 4 . Instead of having the entire ED at a higher privilege level, we insert the minimal amount of code that needs the higher privilege into a shim. The shim is hypervisor specific and has an API that all lower privilege level code utilizes to perform the necessary functionality. This setup allows for the brains of the ED to run inside a VM while still realizing the requirement of the integrity level design. Fig. 5 highlights another variation. This variation represents the architecture we used for our prototype. In this arrangement, all of the domains run in the same privilege except the FD. It still must run below the privilege level of the ED. The above architectures serve as examples of sufficient architectures for integrity level design. While different commercial architectures exist that provide support, we succinctly describe examples based on x86 and ARM platforms.
Hardware virtualization allows for the natural placement and separation between the functional and enforcement domains, although one might envision an implementation with software virtualization techniques. The FD maps to a guest inside a VM, and the ED runs as part of a VMM or hypervisor. Commercial processors from both Intel™ and ARM™ provide virtualization and security extensions (e.g., ARM Trustzone®, Intel™ TXT/SGX). Fig. 6 highlights the ARM Trustzone® platform and placement of the respective domains [15] . The FD and ED placement matches what you find today when running typical VMs on a VMM. The FD is hosted as a VM while the ED resides inside the VMM. We put the RD inside the VMM as an arbitrary choice. Last, we put the PD at the lower privilege level of the secure domain on the ARM Trustzone® platform.
Intel™ architecture has a different arrangement. Similar to ARM Trustzone®, the FD, ED, and RD have the same arrangement as typical VMs on a VMM as shown in Fig. 7 . Intel™ platforms also specify a system management mode (SMM) that has a higher privilege than the other modes of the processor [16] . We suggest putting the PD inside SMM to keep it more protected. Alternatively, other architecture features such as Intel™ trusted execution environment (TXT) or software guard extensions (SGX) provide opportunities for enhanced protection of the policy domain [17, 18] . Once again, this is an arbitrary decision but does meet the requirements of our architecture specification. Future work on an actual hardware implementation may reveal a bias toward where to place the respective domains. 
C. Policy Details
The policy specifies how the computer system should function at each integrity level. When an event of interest occurs, the system may downgrade to a lower integrity level, upgrade to a higher integrity level, or remain at the same integrity level depending on the policy. The downgrade may turn on or turn off functionality as well as hide data. The same can happen with an upgrade, but typically an upgrade would do the reverse. We believe this contrasts with other techniques that purely focus on a binary model of prevention or detection [1, 3, 5, [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Our model seeks to continue operation even with the assumption that compromise will occur. Finally, since the security of the system is based on the declarative policy, formal verification could be employed to verify the policy against a set of constraints. In addition, control flow graphs could be used to generate the policy. However, we do not use them for our prototype.
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) provides a flexible way to define usage control policy [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . The extensible access control markup (XACML) language is a standard ABAC language [24] . Using the document type definition (DTD) of XACML 3.0, we target our grammar toward the computer architecture, events of interest, and mitigation responses. Computer security policy has a well-defined background [7, 13, 29] . We modify the definition from [7] as follows:
x A security policy is a statement that partitions the states of the system into a set of authorized, or secure, states and a set of unauthorized, or nonsecure, states.
x A secure system is a system that starts in an authorized state and cannot enter an unauthorized state.
x A breach of security occurs when a system enters an unauthorized state.
x An integrity level security policy partitions the states of the system into a set of more secure and less secure states.
x An integrity level secure system changes the set of authorized and unauthorized states dynamically based on environment stimuli.
x A breach of integrity level security occurs when a system enters an unauthorized state according to the current integrity level. 
V. PROTOTYPE
To test the idea of integrity levels, we built a prototype that follows the model, runs on an architecture that meets the requirements, and integrates the policy into a runtime engine. Our prototype successful demonstrates an implementation of integrity levels for a traditional computer system. The prototype also answers conjectural questions for each component of integrity level design. The questions are: After reviewing various research papers, we decided that many rootkits attempt to modify and control the system call table [2, 23] . Therefore, we wrote a policy that, when this occurs, the system responds by preventing the attack and downgrades the integrity level without any communication with the FD.
A. Development and Test Environment
We focus on rapid prototyping using open source software (OSS) to build a very basic demo that showcases downgrade capability. We are running Linux version 2.6 downloaded from kernel.org. While Linux 3.x is newer, we feel Linux 2.6 has a stable base. Architecturally, there is nothing unique to Linux Xvisor is an open source hypervisor (or VMM) that supports both x86 and ARM architectures. We built all three from source. The entire software stacks runs inside of the quick emulator (QEMU) platform which models an ARMv7 architecture. We use the setup shown in Fig. 5 , where all domains reside inside the hypervisor except the FD. The model does not represent the best architecture (in our opinion), but the design meets all requirements and does enable us to quickly test the concept.
To test our idea, we chose to write a new system call inside the Linux kernel and recompile the kernel. We added a new interface command inside Busybox to trigger the system call with appropriate parameters. The new system call overwrites a system call entry with a pointer to a function that writes to the dmesg daemon in the kernel and to the screen. This allows us to easily determine if the system call worked or was blocked based on the policy.
The toolchain for building the system resembles similar tools in use today. We highlight where our toolchain flow differs. To ease us in writing the rules, we use a language called Axiomatics Language for Authorization (ALFA) [30] . The ALFA language targets web-based and traditional enterprise IT applications. However, the language allows the system designer to write their own grammar. It has an Eclipse plugin that converts the ALFA rules into the XACML 3.0 standard. Therefore, we wrote all of the rules in ALFA with no modification in XACML. The XACML rules are fed into a Python parser that parses the XACML rules and generates a header file in C. The generated files closely resemble the XACML structure. The resulting header is compiled into the PD inside Xvisor.
B. Runtime Engine
Once the system is running, we issue the command to turn on and set up integrity levels. First, the PD fills in the respective structures to pass to the ED and RD. Neither the ED nor the RD directly uses the policy. Hence, the PD can remove sensitive information if needed before passing on the policy derivative. Both the ED and RD set up internal domain structures to react according to the policy derivative passed to them.
C. Test Case
As mentioned before, our test case attempts to overwrite a system call from within the kernel. We are attempting to mimic the action a rootkit would take to gain control over important features. A unique aspect of our work is that we don't focus on the attack vector. We are not concerned with how the attack works, only the "event point" of the attack. In this case, the event point is the actual write of a different value to the system call table to transfer control to malicious code. This is the actual event the policy is looking to prevent or mitigate. The policy, in our demo case, specifies to decrease the integrity level and don't permit the write. Other policies could permit the write and decrease the level. While our current demo doesn't perform any upgrade test cases, a simple test case would be to replace the compile time system table with a pristine copy and increase the integrity level of the system. We added a new command inside the PD to report the status of the current integrity level. For our prototype, we initialize the system with an integrity level value of two. Upon executing the new system call with integrity levels turned on, the system call executes but the system table is not overwritten. However, the new integrity level reported has a value of one. Therefore, the system has successfully mitigated the modification of the system call table. Subsequent system calls keep the integrity level at a value of one. The possible mitigations are only limited, based on our prototype, to the imagination of the system designer. Upon turning off the integrity level monitoring, the system call successfully overwrote the system call table. A subsequent invocation printed to the screen to indicate a successful attack. Fig. 8 shows the screenshot of the above timeline.
In order for our prototype to successfully mitigate the attack, we have to add additional code to Xvisor. Table I highlights the changes we made and the resulting code increase. The amount of new code to implement integrity levels is very minimal compared to both Xvisor as a whole and the entire system. This presents two advantages. First, the code size allows for formal verification. As the runtime engine code grows, this may change. Second, the trusted computing base is a very small subset of the entire system. Both of these features tend to be design goals of secure computer systems. 
CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
Even though we have built a functional prototype, there are some limitations and challenges with integrity levels. First, fidelity may influence policy grammar. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) represents one method for modifying any aspect of the FD. If the FD (or OS/application) spoke directly with Xvisor (e.g., hypervisor call), we may change the way we write the policy. It would also change how we wrote the runtime engine. Our prototype has a very simple case. As you attempt to monitor more complicated events, the added complexity may or may not change the fidelity of the policy grammar and runtime engine.
XACML has a rule-combining specification in the standard. Depending on the provision, the first matching rule applies. In others, an allow rule takes precedent over a deny rule and vice versa in other cases. To eliminate complexity, we ensure only one rule applied and used the "first-match" provision. Ultimately, our runtime engine ignores the provision, but to scale to a more complete system, this provision would have impact.
The current paradigm assumes all compromise will occur in the FD as that has more than 90% of the system's codebase. However, if the ED, RD, or PD gets compromised, we currently do not have a mitigating factor for this type of compromise. In a more realistic, deployed system, these three domains would either be protected by additional hardware security features or maybe just the PD would have additional protection. Can each of these domains also have their own respective integrity level? This remains an area of open research.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Moving forward, we see opportunity for this work to mature. We see this opportunity both internally and externally. Internally, various areas have the opportunity for refinement: the API, the policy grammar and policy generation, per-app integrity levels, and toolchain robustness. We designed most of the code to be hypervisor and architecture agnostic. We have a very thin layer of code, we call a shim, that is hypervisor (i.e. Xvisor) specific. We created a very basic API but believe a more robust API would be needed for realistic systems.
We used a very simple policy for our prototype. The grammar to specify a system call table resulted in a beginning value and a range. If we want to support generic structures, such as a linked list (e.g., process list), hashtable, or high-level structure, our current grammar does not allow us to do so. We can always add to the grammar, but we would want the grammar to provide flexibility to the variety of data and control structures found in modern and emerging computer systems. Another assumption we had for our prototype revolves around the system designer generating a policy. With advanced heuristics in place, the system could generate a baseline policy by watching the environment during a "learning" phase similar to [3] . Furthermore, a system designer could add to the dynamically generated policy.
The prototype in the paper focuses on protecting OS integrity. There is plenty of malware that does not subvert the OS to actually compromise a system. While not done in this work, per-process integrity levels would be a natural extension for systems that run multiple processes/threads.
We used the standard GNU toolchain and Eclipse framework as our primary toolchain flow. Only the Python parser is unique to our toolchain. However, we would want a parser that understands XACML at a DTD level to let the designer know when an incorrect policy was given, similar to compilation errors for a source code program. Other tools such as a static analyzer could substantially improve policy verification.
Externally, we see three opportunities. First, we believe testing in other hypervisors (e.g., Xen, KVM, etc.) on different architectures would show the flexibility of the new model. Second, adding integrity levels to a different application space (e.g., automobiles, industrial control systems, smart meters, etc.) would prove the wide-reaching goal of this work. Lastly, collaboration with the broader community (i.e., open source community, research labs, universities, etc.) would push the maturation of the current idea and foster better implementations.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There have been many attempts to protect the OS kernel by providing integrity from code running below the OS [3, 19, 21, 23] . To the best of our knowledge, the most similar work can be found in [23, 31, 32] . Our work builds upon these various design goals for our prototype and targets the greater spectrum of polymorphic computing systems.
Our prototype functions very similar to [23] . However, there are some significant differences. First, we have a toolchain to convert policy into implementable functionality inside the ED. While [23] does specify a policy component, the integration into the larger system is not as clear. The authors use the UCON ABC model where we use a standard (XACML 3.0) for our policy grammar. The authors assume a VMM for their work. While a VMM does work well as placement for the ED, RD, and PD, our model does not assume a VMM must be used. Additionally, our work looks at a new paradigm for computing systems versus only looking at traditional computing environments.
IX. CONCLUSION
Systems based on the OS/application model have been susceptible to a variety of attacks over the last decade. This paper presented a new design approach for protecting current and emerging computing systems. We suggested a four-domain model, appropriate architecture, and declarative policy in order to build this new paradigm. We described a prototype we built that successfully demonstrated that integrity levels are feasible to build. Whereas previous work focuses on the "computer", we focus on "computing." Our model applies to traditional computers just as much as to other computing devices, such as medical devices, smart meters, and automobiles. Our proposed paradigm applies to any application space that can use integrity levels to lessen the impact of compromise in a system. Furthermore, we have not found any research describing how a computer system could change functionality depending on the level of compromise within the system. We believe this represents a paradigm shift and opens the door for new research directions.
